Think like an attacker, defend like an expert. 2025 threat landscape awareness.
Execute for automated validation:
| Script | Purpose | Usage |
|---|
scripts/security_scan.py | Validate security principles applied | python scripts/security_scan.py <project_path> |
| File | Purpose |
|---|
| checklists.md | OWASP Top 10, Auth, API, Data protection checklists |
| Principle | Application |
|---|
| Assume Breach | Design as if attacker already inside |
| Zero Trust | Never trust, always verify |
| Defense in Depth | Multiple layers, no single point |
| Least Privilege | Minimum required access only |
| Fail Secure | On error, deny access |
Before scanning, ask:
- What are we protecting? (Assets)
- Who would attack? (Threat actors)
- How would they attack? (Attack vectors)
- What’s the impact? (Business risk)
| Rank | Category | Think About |
|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Who can access what? IDOR, SSRF |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Defaults, headers, exposed services |
| A03 | Software Supply Chain 🆕 | Dependencies, CI/CD, build integrity |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | Weak crypto, exposed secrets |
| A05 | Injection | User input → system commands |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Flawed architecture |
| A07 | Authentication Failures | Session, credential management |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Unsigned updates, tampered data |
| A09 | Logging & Alerting | Blind spots, no monitoring |
| A10 | Exceptional Conditions 🆕 | Error handling, fail-open states |
├── SSRF merged into A01 (Access Control)
├── A02 elevated (Cloud/Container configs)
├── A03 NEW: Supply Chain (major focus)
├── A10 NEW: Exceptional Conditions
└── Focus shift: Root causes > Symptoms
| Vector | Risk | Question to Ask |
|---|
| Dependencies | Malicious packages | Do we audit new deps? |
| Lock files | Integrity attacks | Are they committed? |
| Build pipeline | CI/CD compromise | Who can modify? |
| Registry | Typosquatting | Verified sources? |
- Verify package integrity (checksums)
- Pin versions, audit updates
- Use private registries for critical deps
- Sign and verify artifacts
| Category | Elements |
|---|
| Entry Points | APIs, forms, file uploads |
| Data Flows | Input → Process → Output |
| Trust Boundaries | Where auth/authz checked |
| Assets | Secrets, PII, business data |
Risk = Likelihood × Impact
High Impact + High Likelihood → CRITICAL
High Impact + Low Likelihood → HIGH
Low Impact + High Likelihood → MEDIUM
Low Impact + Low Likelihood → LOW
| Factor | Weight | Question |
|---|
| CVSS Score | Base severity | How severe is the vuln? |
| EPSS Score | Exploit likelihood | Is it being exploited? |
| Asset Value | Business context | What’s at risk? |
| Exposure | Attack surface | Internet-facing? |
Is it actively exploited (EPSS >0.5)?
├── YES → CRITICAL: Immediate action
├── CVSS 7.0-8.9 → Consider asset value
└── CVSS <7.0 → Schedule for later
| Scenario | Fail-Open (BAD) | Fail-Closed (GOOD) |
|---|
| Auth error | Allow access | Deny access |
| Parsing fails | Accept input | Reject input |
| Timeout | Retry forever | Limit + abort |
- Exception handlers that catch-all and ignore
- Missing error handling on security operations
- Race conditions in auth/authz
- Resource exhaustion scenarios
└── Understand the target
└── Identify potential issues
└── Validate and prioritize
├── False positive elimination
├── Clear reproduction steps
| Pattern | Risk | Look For |
|---|
| String concat in queries | Injection | "SELECT * FROM " + user_input |
| Dynamic code execution | RCE | eval(), exec(), Function() |
| Unsafe deserialization | RCE | pickle.loads(), unserialize() |
| Path manipulation | Traversal | User input in file paths |
| Disabled security | Various | verify=False, --insecure |
| Type | Indicators |
|---|
| API Keys | api_key, apikey, high entropy |
| Tokens | token, bearer, jwt |
| Credentials | password, secret, key |
| Cloud | AWS_, AZURE_, GCP_ prefixes |
| Layer | You Own | Provider Owns |
|---|
| Data | ✅ | ❌ |
| Application | ✅ | ❌ |
| OS/Runtime | Depends | Depends |
| Infrastructure | ❌ | ✅ |
- IAM: Least privilege applied?
- Storage: Public buckets?
- Network: Security groups tightened?
- Secrets: Using secrets manager?
| ❌ Don’t | ✅ Do |
|---|
| Scan without understanding | Map attack surface first |
| Alert on every CVE | Prioritize by exploitability + asset |
| Ignore false positives | Maintain verified baseline |
| Fix symptoms only | Address root causes |
| Scan once before deploy | Continuous scanning |
| Trust third-party deps blindly | Verify integrity, audit code |
Each finding should answer:
- What? - Clear vulnerability description
- Where? - Exact location (file, line, endpoint)
- Why? - Root cause explanation
- Impact? - Business consequence
- How to fix? - Specific remediation
| Severity | Criteria |
|---|
| Critical | RCE, auth bypass, mass data exposure |
| High | Data exposure, privilege escalation |
| Medium | Limited scope, requires conditions |
| Low | Informational, best practice |
Remember: Vulnerability scanning finds issues. Expert thinking prioritizes what matters. Always ask: “What would an attacker do with this?”
Always identify gaps and suggest next steps to users. In case there is no gaps anymore, then AI should clearly state that there is no gap left.